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In markets where buyerscannot observe the quality of sellers’ goods, there may
be a role for intermediation. A certi…cation intermediary is an agent that gathers
information about seller quality and reports it to buyers. This paper examines
the choice of such an intermediary between selling guidebooks to buyers, privately
informing them about seller quality, and selling certi…cates to the sellers, publicly
certifying the quality of their goods.
I …nd that the intermediary will choose to sell guidebooks when the di¤erence
between high and low quality is large and when high quality is relatively rare (or
di¢cult to provide). Furthermore, I show that there is a complementarity between
certi…cation and the production of quality. Markets may fail to form as the result
of a coordination failure, in which high-quality sellers do not enter the market
because there is no one to certify their quality, and certi…ers are not credible as a
result of the lack of high-quality sellers.
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Why do markets function e¢ciently in some economies, and not at all in others? One
answer has to do with how buyers and sellers deal with asymmetric information. Agents
will not enter a market if they cannot trust potential trading partners. Participants
in well-functioning markets thus rely on a range of institutions, from formal legal rules
to social norms, to protect them from opportunistic behavior. In the absence of these
institutions, individuals may be forced to rely on non-market forms of exchange, such as
reciprocal trade, that are less e¢cient but leave them less vulnerable to being cheated.
In this paper I look at a speci…c type of institutional response to asymmetric in-
formation: a private, pro…t-maximizing intermediary that provides quality information
to buyers. When buyers are unable to observe the characteristics of sellers’ products,
both buyers and (high-quality) sellers have an interest in communicating information
about product quality. The premise of my paper is that this creates incentives for an
independent third party to provide reports about the seller’s quality. A “certi…cation in-
termediary” (CI) is an agent that is able to inspect the seller’s good and credibly report
its quality to the buyer.
Intermediaries of this type play a prominent role in developed economies. Industrial
labs such as Underwriters Laboratories test and certify the quality of consumer and
industrial products; credit rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard& Poor’s report
on the credit quality of borrowers; accountants certify the accuracy of a …rm’s …nancial
statements; publications such as Consumer Reports ratethe quality of retail products and
services. There are also institutions that play a less obvious role as certi…ers. Franchise
chains such as McDonald’s and Holiday Inn certify the quality of their franchise holders,
and in a similar way retailers oftencertify the quality of products they carry.1 Temporary
employment agencies certify the capabilities of the workers that they refer to employers.
Banks and other …nancial intermediaries inspect the quality of investment products on
1This is clearly not the only role played by franchises or middlemen, but it is often an important one.
For models of middlemen as certi…ers see Biglaiser (1993) and Li (1998).
2the behalf of investors.2
As the above examples illustrate, certi…cation intermediaries can take many forms.
This paper focuses on one aspect of the CI’s institutional form, namely which side of
the market pays the intermediary. One possibility is the guidebook: the intermediary
sells information to buyers about seller quality. Another possibility is the certi…cate:
the intermediary charges a fee to the seller in exchange for public certi…cation of the
good’s quality. Most certi…ers fall into one of these two categories. Apart from actual
guidebooks, examples where buyers pay for information include publications such as
Consumer Reports and credit bureaus like TRW or Equifax. Examples of sellers paying
for certi…cation include credit rating agencies like Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s, as well
as middlemen and franchises such as McDonald’s or Holiday Inn.
I explain how the certi…er’s choice between certi…cates and guidebooks depends on
two parameters, which are the distribution of quality and the importance of quality. I
…nd that the CI chooses to sell guidebooks when the di¤erence between high and low
quality is large, and when high quality is relatively rare. The certi…er’s choice is driven
by the way that prices reveal information. When the CI sells guidebooks to buyers, he
will not fully reveal the information that he collects. This is because, once some buyers
are informed, prices act as a signal of quality to uninformed buyers. When the CI sells
more guidebooks, producing more informed consumers, prices become a more informative
signal and therefore lower the value of the guidebooks. This e¤ect is strongest when the
di¤erence between high and low quality is small, since in this case it is more tempting
for low-quality sellers to choose a fully revealing price.
The pro…tability of guidebooks also depends on how uncertain buyers are about qual-
ity. For example, if almost all sellers have high quality, the amount a buyer would pay
for a guidebook is relatively low, since it is unlikely to make a di¤erence in his decision.
With certi…cates, however, this e¤ect is not present: the amount sellers will pay to be
2Megginson & Weiss (1991) consider the role of venture capitalists in certifying the quality of projects
to the IPO market; Gande et al (1997) consider the certifying role played by banks underwriting public
debt o¤erings.
3certi…ed depends on the importance buyers attach to quality, not on the frequency of
high-quality goods. If the cost of certi…cation is high enough, the CI will in fact play a
parasitic role, in which both high- and low-quality sellers are worse o¤ than they would
be in the intermediary’s absence.
Since I am concerned with a market in which buyers are unable to trust the seller, it
is important to ask why they are better able to trust the CI. Though I assume away the
possibility of a moral hazard problem in inspecting the good, there is the possibility that
the CI will collude with the seller to misrepresent the product’s quality. This problem
can be solved if, when falsely certifying a product, the CI loses credibility with buyers
and thus loses future income. If the CI is “larger” than sellers, this type of reputation
mechanism will be more e¤ective for him than for individual sellers. This largeness can
come either from interactingwith morebuyers, or from interacting withthem more often.
For example, a roadside motel may see very little repeat business, since its customers
are generally just passing through the area. A chain of motels, on the other hand, would
receive much more “repeat business:” even though customers seldom return to the same
motel, they are likely to encounter other hotels in the same chain. Likewise, companies
“go public” only once, and would therefore have an incentive to misrepresent the quality
of their project in making a public o¤ering. Investment banks, however, underwrite
securities frequently, and therefore have reason to cultivate a reputation for honestly
appraising the value of new issues.
The implication of the credibility constraint is di¤erent for sellers of guidebooks and
sellers of certi…cates. Withcerti…cates, credibility depends principally onthe frequency of
high-quality sellers. When high quality is rare, it is more tempting to cheat by certifying
low-quality sellers. For guidebooks, credibility depends mainly on the importance of
quality.
An important reason to look at certi…cation intermediaries is to understand their role
in how markets develop. In developing and transition economies, information problems
play a substantial role. Sheppard (1995) emphasizes that the lack of reliable information
4about potential business partners is a serious di¢culty for private enterprise in Russia.
For example, suppliers are unwilling to extend short-term credit to potential customers.
One reason is that there are no credit rating agencies and no source of reliable infor-
mation on other …rms’ histories. Inspection agencies such as SGS also play a vital role
in international trade. Fafchamps (1996) reports that the lack of such an inspection
service in Ghana leaves exporters vulnerable to claims of low quality on the part of their
customers, which will discourage …rms from entering the export sector.
Understanding how these institutions develop can also help us to understand how
new markets are established in developed economies. For example, internet commerce is
widely seen to have great potential as a retail marketplace. However, the potential for
fraud in anonymous electronic transactions is substantial. It seems likely that internet
commerce will not succeed in the absence of some mechanism that allows individual
customers to trust the merchant that is selling on-line.3
The need to maintain incentives for honest reporting means that we will not see the
…rst-best outcome even when intermediaries can freely compete. This is because, in
order to deter collusion, the CI must attach positive value to buyers’ trust. Maintaining
a reputation is only worthwhile if the reputation can be translated into future pro…ts. If
he were both trusted and making zero pro…ts when honest, there would be nothing to
prevent him from accepting bribes in exchange for certi…cation.
This e¤ect will mean that there is a complementarity between seller investment in
quality and certi…cation of quality. When high-quality sellers are frequent, it is rela-
tively easy for certi…ers to maintain credibility. This means either that certi…cates will
be inexpensive or that guidebooks will be more informative. In either case the value
of being certi…ed is higher, which in turn means that sellers are more likely to …nd it
worth investing in quality. This emphasizes the potential for multiple equilibria: ine¢-
cient certi…cation means that few sellers invest, meaning that e¢cient certi…cation is not
3For a discussion of the role of third-party intermediaries in internet commerce (from the perspective
of optimal regulation), see Froomkin (1996).
5pro…table. When high quality is rare, the CI can only be credible if he charges a high
price for certi…cation, which in turn means that there are low incentives for the seller to
invest.
There is a growing literature that has addressed some other aspects of certi…cation
intermediaries. Lizzeri (1999) and Albano & Lizzeri (1998) focus on the disclosure policy
of the CI. In these papers there is a large number of possible seller types, and the central
question is how much information the CI will choose to reveal. The CI will generally not
…nd it optimal to reveal all information to buyers, and in some cases can make the most
pro…t by providing a completely uninformative signal. In contrast, my paper considers a
model with only two seller types, which makes the disclosure problem simple and allows
us to focus on the certi…er’s choice of institutional form.
Biglaiser (1993) and Biglaiser & Friedman (1994) consider how “middlemen” play
the role of certifying the unknown quality of sellers. In Biglaiser (1993), middlemen
invest in developing expertise that enables them to screen out low-quality products, and
in Biglaiser & Friedman (1994), the fact that middlemen sell several di¤erent products
enables them to credibly commit to carrying only high-quality goods, thus mitigating
the moral hazard problem faced by individual sellers. My paper will follow these in
using reputation to explain the certi…er’s credibility: the middleman is willing to screen
out low-quality goods because otherwise buyers will not trust them in the future. Li
(1998) also considers the role of middlemen in assuring quality, in a model of search
where agents sometimes postpone trade because they cannot assess the quality of their
trading partner’s good. These papers start with the question of why middlemen exist,
and demonstrate that quality certi…cation can be an answer. My paper begins with
intermediation, and asks what form it will take.
The problem addressed inmy paper is also closely related tothe literatureon auditing,
which considers a principal-agent framework where the principal has the opportunity to
hire an auditor to report on the e¤ort choice of the agent.4 My problem is similar; the
4The problem of “heirarchical agency” is introduced in Tirole (1986). For a recent example see Khalil
6CI plays a role similar to that of an auditor reporting on the choice of the seller. The
di¤erenceis that theauditing problem is one of mechanismdesign: the principal attempts
to design a contract based on the auditor’s report (and other observable variables) that
creates the correct incentives for the agent. In my model, players cannot write contracts
based on the report of the CI; rather, the information revealed by the CI becomes part
of the equilibrium prices and demand in the market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic
model. Section 3 describes the equilibrium prices charged by sellers, taking as given
the seller’s investment policy and the certi…cation policy of the CI. Section 4 describes
the optimal policy of a monopolist certi…er and what this means for the seller’s surplus.
Section5 considers thecase ofcompetitionin the certi…cationmarket. Section6 considers
the case where sellers invest in quality and demonstrates the complementarity between
certi…cation and investment in quality, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Model
2.1. Buyers and sellers
There is a single seller and a continuum of buyers of measure one. The good produced by
the seller has an associated quality level, Q 2 fL;Hg, which is unknown to the buyers.
For now I will assume that quality is decided by nature; the seller’s quality is H with
probability µ and L with probability (1¡µ); I later endogenize the distribution of quality
by considering the case where the seller makes an unobservable investment in the quality
of her good. The seller can produce an unlimited amount of the good at zero marginal
cost. Buyers cannot observe the seller’s quality, but µ is common knowledge.
Each buyer demands at most a single unit of the good. Buyers value goods of quality
Q at vQ, with vH > vL > 0. For simplicity, I will set vL = 1.
& Lawarée (1998)
7Buyers and sellers are risk-neutral. The payo¤ for buyers is
uB = [vQ ¡ p]di;
where di is the probability that buyer i purchases the good and p is the price charged by




0 di is expected demand for the good. Note that if the seller has no way to
signal that she has high quality, then price must be the same for high- and low-quality
goods.
The assumptionofa single sellerandmany buyersimplies thatthere is nocompetition
among sellers. An alternative assumption that would not change the outcome is that
there are several sellers, but that products are highly di¤erentiated, so that sellers do not
compete for customers. The assumption that sellers do not compete means that buyers
have no bargaining power, and makes the problem much more tractable.
It is important to the model that sellers do not facemuchrepeat business, whichseems
most reasonable for services that are performed rarely, or mostly for tourists. Examples
would include management consulting, or hotels or restaurants in a resort area. Another
example is an investment problem, where potential investors cannot observe the quality
of an entrepreneur’s project.
2.2. Certi…cation intermediaries
We now introduce a “certi…cation intermediary” (or CI). This is an agent or …rm that is
able to observe the quality of the seller and make reports to the buyers. I will assume
that observation of the product’s quality is costless to the CI. In Sections 3 and 4 I
assume that the intermediary is a monopolist, and in Section 5 I consider the case of
competition among intermediaries.
I assume that the intermediary is the only way for the seller to communicate the
quality of her good; that is, there is nosignalling mechanism apart from the intermediary.
8Part of this is the assumption that the cost of producing high- and low-quality goods is
the same, so that payo¤s for both types of sellers are the same. We could alternatively
suppose that the intermediary o¤ers the least costly form of signaling. Even when some
signalling mechanism is present, it is generally wasteful. The CI, then, may be able to
o¤er a more e¢cient mechanism than that which is otherwise available. In other words,
we could describe the model as one in which the signalling mechanism is not provided
by an exogenously given technology, but by an endogenously arising institution.
A central assumption of my model is that the CI earns money by following one
of two fee strategies: either charging a fee to buyers for access to the information (sell
guidebooks), or to the seller for reporting the information (sell certi…cates). Relaxing this
assumption does not change the main results: in cases where the CI chooses guidebooks,
the more general model predicts that the CI will make a larger portion of his revenues
from buyers. We do not in fact see this “mixed” form of CI much in the world; sellers
of guidebooks often make a point of not accepting any payments from those that they
inspect. One possible explanation involves issues of credibility that lie outsidemy current
model: from the buyer’s perspective, it may be impossible to distinguish bribes from
legitimate fees. In this case, refusing any payment from sellers may be the best way for
the CI to convince buyers that his interests are independent of the seller’s interests.
I assume the intermediary can freely observe the seller’s quality; this means that I
ignore any possible moral hazard problem on the part of the intermediary. In some cases,
the ability to identify quality is not much of an issue; for example, a movie critic need
only view a …lm once. In other cases, such as determining the failure rate of a …re alarm
or the authenticity of a gem, a considerable investment in testing equipment or expertise
may be necessary.5 If gathering information is costly and observable, then the results
5Another possibility is that the CI does not generate information, but acts as a conduit for information
generated by many buyers who do not communicate with one another. Biglaiser & Friedman (1994)
discuss the possibility that a middleman who sells to many customers has the chance to receive reports
from them on the quality of the products that he sold. Klein (1997) considers a credit agency that
receives reports from retailers about the repayment history of the customers to whom they extend
9of the model will not be a¤ected, but if this cost is unobservable then we need to be
concerned with the possibility of the CI shirking.
It is important to emphasize the importance of the assumption that sellers have only
two possible quality levels. Because there are only two possible types, I assume that
the CI report, r, will take on only one of two values: r 2 fh;lg. This makes the model
much more tractable: with a large number of quality levels, as in Lizzeri (1999), the
CI’s choice of a map from types to reports is a much more di¢cult problem. Simplifying
the “disclosure problem” by restricting the number of types allows us to focus on other
aspects of how the market for certi…cation is organized.
A strategy for the CI, P, is given by ft;m;r(Q)g where
² t 2 fC;Gg is a decision of whether to sell guidebooks to buyers (t = G) or sell
certi…cates to sellers (t = C),
² m 2 [0;1] is the proportion of buyers who observe the report, and
² r(Q) is the CI’s report as a function of the seller’s quality.
“Honest” certi…cation would consist of r(H) = h and r(L) = l. I will not allow for a
mixed strategy on the part of the certi…er. It turns out that pure strategies are played
in equilibrium even if we allow for mixed strategies, and so I will stick to pure strategies
to simplify the notation.
2.3. Timing
The timing of the problem is as follows:
Stage 1. Nature chooses seller quality and CI chooses (and announces) a strategy P.
Stage 2. Seller decides whether to apply for certi…cation and buyers decide whether
to purchase signals from CI.
credit.
10Stage 3. CI makes announcement, and based on the announcement, market price &
demand are determined.
Notice that the CI chooses a strategy before learning the type of the seller; once P
is chosen, reports and fees cannot be changed. In other words, I assume that the CI’s
announced policy is credible. Later I introduce the possibility of renegotiating payments
and reports between stage 2 and 3, so that buyers need to worry about the credibility of
the CI.
To solve the model, I will …rst …nd the equilibrium of the …nal stage, where the
seller chooses a price and buyers form beliefs given the report of the CI. I will then …nd
the equilibrium choices of certi…cation policy with a monopoly CI (Section 4) and with
competition (Section 5).
3. Pricing Game
This section considers a smaller game in which there is no CI, but there some fraction
of the buyers who are “informed,” meaning that they know the quality of the seller’s
product. The reason for considering this game is that it will describe how equilibrium
prices and payo¤s are determined in the larger game once the CI has revealed quality
information to the buyers. The presence of informed buyers means that prices may in
themselves act as a signal, as in models by Chan and Leland (1982) or Wolinsky (1983).
The di¤erence (as we will see in later sections) is that with the CI as the only source of
information, the number of informed buyers is endogenously determined. It is important
to examine how information is revealed through prices in order to be able to describe the
CI’s decision about how much information to reveal directly.
It is important tonote that in my model prices signal quality only due to the presence
of informed buyers, and not due to di¤erences in the cost functions of the two types of
seller, as in models such as that of Bagwell and Riordan (1991). This means that in
the absence of any informed consumers, price could not in any way signal quality. In
reality, producers of di¤erent quality levels are likely to have di¤erent marginal costs,
11so that we would expect cost-based signalling to be possible. Here, the fact that high-
and low-quality sellers have the same costs allows us to isolate the CI’s role in revealing
information.
Suppose that a fraction m of the buyers know the quality of the good. De…ne the be-
liefs of uninformed buyers about the value of the seller’s good as b(p) 2 [1;vH]: Assuming
that buyers buy when indi¤erent, demand for the seller’s good will be given by
D(p;b(p)) = mI[p · vQ] + (1¡ m)I[p · b(p)];
where I[:] represents the indicator function. The …rst term in the expression is the
demand of informed buyers, who will buy as long as the price is less than or equal to the
actual value of the good. The second term is the expected demand of the uninformed,
who buy as long as longas the price ofthe good is less than or equal to the expectedvalue
of the good given its price. A sequential equilibrium of the pricing game is described by




¤) = E[vQjp = p
¤(Q)] (3.2)
(3.1) says that the seller is maximizing her utility given her certi…cation status and the
demand function, which depends in turn on the number of uninformed buyers and their
beliefs. (3.2) says that uninformed buyer beliefs are rational at equilibrium prices.
The presenceof informedbuyers means that the price chargedby the seller may reveal
her type. As usual, I de…ne an separating equilibrium as one in which p(H) 6= p(L) with
probability one, and a pooling equilibrium as one in which p(H) = p(L) with probability
one. I also allow partial pooling, in which the probability that p(H) = p(L) is strictly
between zero and one (that is, at least on type of seller plays a mix between separating
and revealing prices). Thefollowing proposition shows that whenthe number of informed
buyers is large enough, we must have a separating equilibrium, in which high- and low-
quality sellers choose di¤erent prices. This is important becausein order forguidebooksto
12be pro…table, there must be at least partial pooling. A separating equilibrium means that
prices reveal quality entirely, so that there is no reason for buyers to pay for information.
The fact that separation occurs when many buyers are informed means that a guidebook
seller will optimally limit the number of guidebooks that he sells.




¹ V g, and mS =
vH¡1
vH . An equilibrium with
complete pooling exists if and only if m · mP, and an equilibrium with partial pooling
exists if and only if m < mS.
Proof.
1. Complete pooling. Necessity. Suppose we have complete pooling at a price ^ p. From
(3.2) we must have b(^ p) = ¹ V . This implies we must have ^ p · ¹ V ; otherwise the
seller would make zero pro…ts, and she could do better by setting p = 1 and selling
to everyone. If ^ p is the optimal choice of a high-quality seller, it must be that she
cannot do better by charging vH and selling only to informed buyers. This implies




vH · mP. For ^ p to be the optimal choice of low-quality
sellers, it must bethat they cannot dobetter by charging 1 and selling to all buyers,
that is, (1¡ m)^ p ¸ 1, or m · ^ p¡1
^ p ·
¹ V ¡1
¹ V · mP.
Su¢ciency. Consider p(H) = p(L) = ¹ V . Let b(p) = 1 for all p 6= ¹ V . Demand
for a high-quality seller is given by 1 for p = ¹ V or p · 1, and m for p 2 (1;vH]
and p 6= ¹ V . The only relevant prices for the high-quality seller are thus ¹ V and vH;
p = ¹ V will o¤er higher pro…ts if ¹ V ¸ mvH, or m ·
¹ V
vH · mP.
2. Partial pooling. Necessity. For a low-quality seller to be indi¤erent between charg-
ing 1, and getting pro…ts of 1, or charging p(H), getting pro…ts of (1 ¡ m)p(H),
we must have p(H) = 1
1¡m. If m ¸ mS =
vH¡1
vH , we have p(H) ¸ vH. But if a
low-quality seller is choosing p(H) with positive probability, this means p(H) >
E[vQjp = p¤(H)], so that demand at this price is zero.
Su¢ciency. Consider p(H) =
1
1¡m. At this price, a low-quality seller will be
indi¤erent between charging 1 and selling to everyone, and charging p(H) and
13selling to the (1¡ m) uninformed buyers. If 1
1¡m < vH, then there is some " such
that if low-quality sellers choose p(H) with probability less than ", we will have
E[vQjp = p¤(H)] · vH:
Proposition 1.1. establishes a key element of the pricing game: when there are more
informedbuyers, the likelihoodof separationwill be greater. Intuitively, theseller chooses
whether to target the informed or the uninformed side of the market. The larger the
informed side of the market, the more tempting it is to choose a price that targets
the informed and thus reveals quality. This is true of all sequential equilibria. Before
describing the equilibria in more detail, I show that in equilibrium a high-quality seller
will play a pure strategy.
Lemma 3.2. De…ne ^ p as follows:
^ p = maxfpjp · b(p)g
In equilibrium, p(H) = ^ p with probability one.
Proof. Note …rst that I need to show or assume that ^ p exists.
(1) Suppose ^ p = vH. This implies that D(p0;C) = 18p0 · ^ p. Any price higher than
^ p would yield demand of 0. So ^ p = vH is uniquely optimal for the seller.
(2) Suppose ^ p < vH. since D(p0;C) = 18p0 · ^ p, there is no reason for a certi…ed
seller to choose a price lower than ^ p. This means that if a certi…ed seller is not choosing
^ p with probability one, she must be choosing some price ~ p > ^ p with positive probability.
Since D(p0;NC) = 08p0 2 (^ p;vH], there is no reason for an uncerti…ed seller to choose
a price higher than ^ p. Since only certi…ed sellers will choose ~ p, we must have b(~ p) = vH;
contradicting the de…nition of ^ p:
In other words, in equilibrium a certi…ed seller must be charging a price at which all
buyers demand the good. If some buyers were to demand the good while others did not,
it must be the informed that demand it. But charging a price that only the informed











Figure 3.1: Equilibrium prices given the number of informed buyers.
Figure 1 illustrates the potential equilibria in terms of p(H) and m. A pooling
equilibrium exists for any p(H) 2 [ 1
1¡m; ¹ V]. Such an equilibrium could be supported by
beliefs of the form b(p(H)) = ¹ V, b(p0) = 1 for p0 6= p(H). A separating equilibrium
exists for p(H) 2 [mvH; 1
1¡m] (and p(H) 2 (1;vH]). Such an equilibrium is supported by
beliefs of the form b(p(H)) = p(H), b(p0) = 1 for p0 6= p(H). Finally, a partial pooling
equilibrium can exist with p(H) =
1
1¡m.
To make more speci…c predictions we will need a more precise description of the
equilibrium. I will next make assumptions su¢cient to imply a unique equilibrium of the
pricing game.
Assumption (A1). p¤(Q) = E[vQjp = p¤(Q)]:
Assumption (A2). vH · 4:
(A1) says that in equilibrium the price charged by the seller is equal to the expected
value of her good. The price that a high-quality seller will charge under this assumption,
which I de…ne as ^ V (m), is denoted by the heavy line in Figure 1.6 When m is small,
6Restricting attention to perfect sequential equilibria, as de…ned by Grossman and Perry (1986), will
15(A1) selects the equilibrium with complete pooling at a price equal to ¹ V . When m is
close to one, (A1) implies that a high-quality seller will choose a price equal to vH, and a
low-quality seller a price of 1. For values of m between mP and mS, (A1) implies partial
pooling, with a low-quality seller mixing between p = 1 and p = p(H). The probability
that a low-quality seller will choose p(H) is just large enough so that the expected value
of the good is equal to its price. If we de…ne z as this probability, then z must satisfy
p(H) =
µvH + z(1¡ µ)
µ + z(1¡ µ)
:
(A2) is necessary to guarantee that, for all m, an equilibrium exists with buyers
playing a pure strategy. If (A2) is false, there is a value of m such that if there is any
pooling, high-quality sellers will want to choose p = vH, and if sellers choose this price,
low-quality sellers will want to pool, which cannot be an equilibrium.
In the equilibrium described here, the price charged by high-quality sellers changes
continuously in the number of informed buyers. This will mean that the problem faced
by a guidebook-seller is “smooth:” a slight increase in the number of informed buyers
implies a slight increase in the amount of information revealed by prices. As we will see,
this will imply a slight decrease in the amount a buyer would be willing to pay to become
informed.
I will next turn to the equilibrium strategies in the larger game, in which the CI
determines the number of informed buyers. In Section 4 I describe the equilibrium when
the CI is a monopolist, and in Section 5 I consider the case of competing certi…ers.
4. Monopoly intermediary
This section considers the optimal policy of a monopoly intermediary. I begin by assum-
ing that the CI can commit to reporting honestly, and examine the CI’s choice between
imply the that a high-quality seller follows the same strategy as that implied by (A1). However it allows
a larger set of strategies for a low-quality seller when m 2 (mP;mS).
16guidebooks and certi…cates. I then consider how the possibility of collusion restricts the
CI’s choice of strategy.
4.1. CI sells guidebooks
When the CI makes money by selling guidebooks, his pro…ts depend on the number of
guidebooks sold, m, multiplied by the price each buyer pays for the guidebook. We have
seen from the previous section that as m increases, more information is revealed through
prices, which will in turn lower the value of guidebooks. This means that the CI faces a
trade-o¤ between selling more guidebooks and maintaining a high price per guidebook.
To …nd out how much a buyer would be willing to pay for a guidebook, consider the
expected surplus to an uninformed buyer (one without the guidebook) from purchasing
the good. De…ne z(m) as the probability that an uncerti…ed seller will charge the same
price as a certi…ed seller (so z = 1 implies complete pooling). Before the price has been
set, the expected surplus can be expressed as
µ[vH ¡ V (m)] + z(m)(1¡ µ)[1 ¡V (m)] +(1 ¡ µ)[1¡ z(m)][1¡ 1] (4.1)
The …rst term is the expected surplus given that the good is of high quality. The second
term is the expected loss from overpaying for the good; that is, the loss incurred when the
good is of low quality but that the seller chooses the same price as a high-quality seller.
The third term is the expected surplus given that the good is low quality and the seller
chooses the low price, in which case the buyer knows the quality exactly. Assumption
(A1) from the previous section implies that the …rst two terms cancel out, so that the
expected surplus of an uninformed buyer is zero.
An informed buyer will be able to distinguish between high- and low-quality goods.
This means that he will not buy the good when the price is high and quality is low. The
informed buyer’s expected surplus is given by
µ[vH ¡ ^ V (m)] +(1 ¡ µ)[1¡ z(m)][1 ¡ 1] (4.2)
17The amount that abuyer wouldbe willingtopay for a guidebook is givenbythe di¤erence
between the expected surplus of informed and uninformed buyers. De…ne as x(m) the
price that the CI charges for the report. x is given by the di¤erence of (4.2) and (4.1) as
x(m) = z(m)[1¡ µ][^ V (m)¡ 1] (4.3)















and z is the probability that an uncerti…ed seller will mimic a certi…ed seller.
(4.3) is increasing in z: the more likely is pooling, the more buyers will pay for a
guidebook. This makes clear the trade-o¤ between the value of the CI’s information and
the amount of information that he sells. z is decreasing in m: the more informed buyers
there are, the greater will be the incentive for the seller to choose a separating price.
So if the CI increases m (sells more guidebooks), this will decrease z and thus decrease
x. When enough buyers are informed that we have complete separation (z = 0), then
information about the quality of an individual seller is freely available (that is, revealed
by the price). That means x = 0 and the CI will make no money. Thus we must have at
least partial pooling when the CI sells guidebooks.






where we have made use of the implication of Assumption (A1) that z(m)[1¡µ][^ V (m)¡
1] = µ[vH ¡ ^ V (m)] and that ^ V (m) = 1
1¡m.
The following lemma gives the CI’s optimal strategy as a function of the parameters
vH and µ.
Lemma 4.1. Assume (A1) and that the CI sells guidebooks. The optimal choice of m






































Lemma 4.1 establishes two important facts about guidebooks. First, CI pro…ts are
higher for higher values of vH and for intermediate values of µ. Higher values of vH are
good for the CI because when there is a greater di¤erence between high- and low-quality
goods, information about quality is more valuable to buyers. Intermediate values of µ
are best for the CI because they imply the “most uncertainty” about the quality of the
good. If high quality is very rare or very common, then there is correspondingly little
chance that the guidebook will make a big di¤erence to the buyer.
Second, the CI chooses partial pooling when µ is small. This happens because when
high quality is unlikely, the cost of maintaining complete pooling is greatest. When there
is complete pooling, an uncerti…ed seller sells only to uninformed buyers, and has the
option of lowering her price and selling to all buyers. When µ is small, the pooling price
is close to 1, so the cost of lowering her price is small. This means that for the seller to
prefer the pooling price, there must be very few informed buyers. In this case it is more
pro…table for the CI to allow some separation, which lowers the price he can charge for
the information, because it allows him to sell more guidebooks.
4.2. CI sells certi…cates
I assume that when the CI sells certi…cates, he bargains with the seller over the fee.
Denote the bargaining power of the CI by ¯ 2 [0;1]. The CI will keep this fraction of
the surplus the seller receives from certi…cation. An alternative assumption is that there
exists an alternative, costly signalling technology, and that the CI can make a take-it-or-
leave-it o¤er to the seller. In this case, ¯ re‡ects the e¢ciency of the alternative signal;
a low ¯ corresponds to an inexpensive alternative.
19The value of certi…cation to the seller is clearly increasing in the number of informed
buyers. This means that with certi…cates the CI chooses m ¸ mS. If all buyers learn the
results of the report, each seller will be willing to pay vH ¡ 1 to be certi…ed. Thus the
expected pro…ts of the CI will be
¯µ[vH ¡ 1]: (4.6)
Notice that, unlike the case where the CI sells guidebooks, when the CI sells certi…-
cates pro…ts are increasing in µ. Even when low-quality sellers are very rare, the CI’s
report determines whether the seller receives a high or low price. This highlights the
potential for a “parasitic” role on the part of the intermediary, based on his ability to
collect information rents from the seller.
4.3. Optimal CI strategy with commitment
In deciding whether to sell guidebooks or sell certi…cates, the CI will simply compare the
pro…ts earned by following the optimal policy in each case. The following proposition
describes the CI’s optimal policy in terms of the parameters.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose (A1) and (A2). Given vH and µ, the optimal CI policy is
given by the following:
1) If vH > (
1¡µ
µ )2 and vH > 1+
¯
µ[(1¡µ)¡¯] and µ < 1¡ ¯, then the CI sells guidebooks
and m = mP (complete pooling).
2) If vH < (1¡µ
µ )2 and vH > (
1+¯






3) If µ ¸ 1¡ ¯, or vH < (
1+¯
1¡¯)2; or vH > (1¡µ
µ )2 and vH < 1 +
¯
µ[(1¡µ)¡¯], then the CI
sells certi…cates and m ¸ mS (separation).
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2 illustrates this result. The area marked “F” represents parameter values for












Figure 4.1: Optimal Choice of a Monopoly CI
and “Gpp” represents selling guidebooks withpartial pooling. We see that the CI chooses
to sell franchises when µ is large and when vH is small.
This means thatfor guidebooks tobe more pro…table, quality mustbeboth important
and uncertain. When buyers attach a high importance to quality, the demand for both
guidebooks and certi…cates will be high. But the di¤erence between high and low quality
is particularly important for guidebooks, since it a¤ects how much information the CI
can reveal without causing the seller to choose a separating price. When this di¤erence
is small, it is less costly for low-quality sellers to reveal their quality. This means that
the CI cannot sell many guidebooks without undermining their value.
Uncertainty drives the demand for guidebooks in a direct way. Buyers will not pay
much for guidebooks unless there is a large probability that without consulting a guide-
book they will overpay for the good. When high-quality sellers are very common, the
chances are low that the guidebook will make a di¤erence for a given buyer, so the CI
cannot charge a high price.
21These results may help explain the patterns of certi…cation that we see in the restau-
rant and hotel industries. The di¤erence between high- and low-quality fast food is not
as great as the di¤erence between high- and low-quality French cuisine, and the talents
necessary for preparing a …ne meal are not as common as those necessary for cooking a
hamburger. Thus we would expect fast food restaurants to be certi…ed by franchises (a
type of certi…cate), while …ne restaurants are certi…ed by guidebooks.
In contrast to the guidebook case, when the CI sells certi…cates, pro…ts are always
increasing in µ. Even when high quality is very common, it is the CI’s report that
determines whether the seller receives a high or low price. This means that it is quite
possible that the CI makes both high- and low-quality sellers worse o¤ than they would
be inthe absence of the CI. The payo¤s of a high-quality seller, givenfranchises are given
by (1¡ ¯)vH. The CI plays this “parasitic” role if (1¡ ¯)vH < ¹ V , or ¯ > (1 ¡ µ)
vH¡1
vH .7
With guidebooks a high-quality seller will always be weakly better o¤ than with no
intermediary; however with complete pooling his payo¤ will be the same. In this case,
guidebooks represent a transfer from low-quality sellers to the intermediary.
4.4. Repeated Interaction & Collusion
To now I have assumed that the CI is able to credibly commit to make an honest report;
that is, while buyers cannot trust the seller, they completely trust the CI. In this subsec-
tion I consider explicitly the possibility that the CI will behave dishonestly. Speci…cally,
the CI could collude with a low-quality seller, accepting a bribe in exchange for dishonest
certi…cation.
The problem of establishing CI credibility is similar to the problem of collusion in the
principal-agent model, as studied, for example, in Tirole (1986) and La¤ont & Martimort
(1998). In these models, the principal hires a third party (an auditor) to report on the
7It is well known that the availability of a costly signalling mechanism can make all agents worse o¤
in a problem of asymmetric information; Lizzeri (1998) also points out that this extends to the case of
a private-sector certi…er.
22e¤ort choice of the agent. The principal faces the possibility that the auditor will collude
withtheagent tomisrepresent theagent’strue e¤ort choice. Toprevent this, theauditor’s
contract must be designed so that he has no incentive to collude; this imposes an extra
constraint on the set of possible solutions to the overall contracting problem.
Our problem is similar: the CI can be thought of as an “auditor” paid by the buyer to
monitor the seller’s quality claims. However, I do not look at acontractual solution to the
problem. Because buyers are a large, dispersed group, they cannot write a contract with
the CI that is contingent on his report. Instead, I rely on repeated interaction to give the
CI a reason to refuse bribes. I assume that if the CI lies about the seller’s quality, buyers
will not attach any weight to the certi…er’s report in the future. Given these beliefs, the
CI will remain honest as long as the one-shot gain from accepting a bribe is outweighed
by the loss of future pro…ts that results from losing the trust of buyers.
Repeated interaction could also give sellers the opportunity to maintain a reputation
for quality. I assume that the CI is larger than the seller, in the sense that he interacts
with the buyer more often. Recall the example of a hotel from the introduction. An
individual hotel owner may never deal with a given customer more than once, whereas
a hotel certi…er (either a franchise chain or a hotel guidebook) will on average interact
with a customer much more often. This means that, for the CI, the ratio of potential
future pro…ts from the customer to the value of cheating the customer in the current
period is much greater. It is this greater ratio that makes it easier for the CI to commit
to an honest policy.
To capture the idea that the CI sees the buyer more often than the seller does, I will
assume that the certi…er is in…nitely-lived, while sellers operate for only one period. This
is meant to approximate the case where there is a large number of sellers, each of whom
interacts with a given buyer only rarely.
I consider an in…nitely repeated game in which there is a new seller every period, and
each seller lives for only one period. The CI lives forever and discounts the future at the
rate ± 2 (0;1).
23The timing of the stage game is as follows:
1. Nature chooses seller’s type (Qt = H w/ prob. µ), and CI chooses a strategy Pt.
2. Sellers pay for certi…cates or buyers for guidebooks.
3. Report rt is announced and pricing equilibrium happens.
4. All players (including future sellers) observe good’s quality.
The assumption in step 4, that all players observe the quality of the good, is strong.
A more reasonable story with similar results would be that all players in period t can
observe price and demand in period t¡1. As long as some buyers live for more than one
period, the price they are willing to pay will re‡ect their beliefs about the CI’s policy,
revealing what they observed in the past. If not all players can observe past actions,
credibility will be more di¢cult for the CI to maintain, so in this sense we are looking at
the most optimistic case.
Considering an in…nitely repeated game, of course, opens the door to a very large
set of equilibria. I will limit this set by considering a particular speci…cation of beliefs
that I think are intuitively plausible. I assume that buyers believe that the CI will make
an honest report in the current period provided that 1) the CI has been honest in every
periodinthe past, and2) the CI strategy, if followedin the current and all futureperiods,
will give the CI greater pro…ts than he could obtain by “cheating” in the current period
and losing all future credibility.
This assumption on buyer beliefs amounts essentially to allowing the CI to choose
the most pro…table equilibrium of the repeated game. While this is a strong assumption,
it has the advantage of being the most favorable to the success of a CI. That is, if a CI
cannot credibly operate under these assumptions, then he will not be able to operate
under any other set of buyer beliefs.
These assumptions on buyer beliefs mean that the buyer is restricted to strategies
that satisfy a “no-collusion constraint,” which says that future payo¤s are high enough
to outweigh cheating in the current period. De…ne W(r) as expected payo¤s to a seller
receiving report r from the CI. This allows us to describe the “value of certi…cation” to a
24seller. The di¤erence betweenthe payo¤s ofacerti…edanduncerti…edseller, W(h)¡W(l),
represents the most that a seller would be willing to pay to become certi…ed. This is the
largest bribe that a low-quality seller would pay for a false report, and it therefore de…nes
the highest possible payo¤ that the CI can receive by cheating. For the CI’s policy to be
incentive-compatible, it must be that, when his policy calls for not certifying the seller
(r = l), he prefers the continuation payo¤s of staying in business to the largest bribe the
seller would o¤er.
Assumption Suppose that the CI announces strategy P in period s. Buyers believe
that the CI’s report in period s will be honest only if





t¼(P) ¸ W(h) ¡W(l) (NC)
where ¼(P) is the CI’s per-period payo¤ from following the strategy P.
(NC) says that the discounted value of continuation payo¤s must be greater than or
equal to the largest bribe that an uncerti…ed seller would o¤er. The idea is that, if the CI
would be willing to accept a bribe when his policy calls for not certifying the seller, then
buyers will realize this, so that a report that the seller is certi…ed will be ignored. Notice
that the right-hand side of the constraint does not depend on the probability that the
seller is of low quality. Even if low quality is very rare, it is precisely when a low-quality
seller is discovered that it is important for honesty to be optimal.
For certi…cates, the value of certi…cationto sellers is given by (vH¡1), while CI pro…ts








This constraint is illustrated by the vertical line in Figure 3. To the left of this line,
a certi…cate will not be credible: when high-quality sellers are rare (µ is low), it is too
25tempting for the CI to collude with low-quality sellers. Note that vH does not a¤ect
the no-collusion constraint for a certi…cate seller. Although a larger vH implies greater
pro…ts from being truthful, it also increases the payo¤s to cheating, and by the same
proportion.
(NCC) can also be written ± ¸ 1
1+¯µ. As we would expect, the discount rate necessary
to maintain honesty is lower when the bargaining power of the CI, ¯, is larger. Note
however that even if the CI keeps all of the surplus from certi…cation (¯ = 1), honesty is
still not possible for ± < 1
1+µ.
For guidebooks, the payo¤ of a certi…ed seller is given by ^ V (m), while the payo¤ of
an uncerti…ed seller is given by (1¡m)^ V (m). This means that the value of certi…cation
to the seller is m^ V(m) while CI pro…ts are given by mµ(vH ¡ ^ V (m)). It can be shown
(see appendix) that the implication of the no-collusion constraint for this case is
vH ¸
(1¡ µ)[±µ + (1¡ ±)]
µ[±(1¡ µ) ¡ (1¡ ±)]
: (NCG)
Figure 4.2 illustrates the implications of (NC) for the CI’s choice between certi…cates
and guidebooks. Compared to the case with commitment, there are two changes: …rst,
thereare parameters for whichtheCI cannotcredibly operate. Second, there is aregionin
which, with commitment, the CI would havechosen certi…cates, but without commitment
chooses guidebooks.
The no-collusion constraint impacts certi…cates and guidebooks in di¤erent ways.
With certi…cates, the (NC) constraint does not depend on vH. Larger values of vH imply
that the gains from colluding and the gains from honest reporting increase proportion-
ately. With guidebooks, an increase in vH increases the gains to cooperation by more
than it increases the gains to collusion.
For ± > 1
1+¯ (necessary if certi…cates are credible for some µ), the statement that
“guidebooks are more pro…table” is more restrictive than the statement that “guide-
books are credible.” This means that there is a region where the CI would like to choose
certi…cates, but since these are not feasible he chooses guidebooks instead. The shaded
















27certi…cates, if feasible, would be more pro…table. When µ is low, so that high-quality
sellers are rare, the value of future business is not great enough to make honest certi…-
cation incentive-compatible. It is too tempting to collude with a low-quality seller, so
that the CI cannot credibly sell certi…cates. It may be possible for the CI to credibly
sell guidebooks instead, because the payo¤s to cheating are not as large relative to the
payo¤s to honesty.
5. Competing Intermediaries
Next I consider the case of competition in the market for certi…cation. In general, com-
petition is good for high-quality sellers: competing certi…ers will charge lower fees for
certi…cates, or sell more guidebooks. However, even with competition, we do not get
costless revelation of all information. This is because the no-collusion constraint means
that an active CI must make positive pro…ts in equilibrium. This follows the basic logic
of Klein & Le-er (1981), in which the authors point out that if repeated sales are to give
a producer the incentive to provide quality products, then the producer must be receiving
a price above production costs. To prevent the seller from misleading customers, future
rewards must outweigh the present gains from cheating. If pro…ts from playing honestly
are zero, then there can be no penalty for cheating customers. The same logic implies
that, to prevent certi…ers from colluding with low-quality sellers and providing a false
report, the CI must keep some of the surplus created by high-quality sellers. If a CI is
making zero pro…ts, and buyers believe his report, then he will be able to make positive
pro…ts by abusing this trust and accepting a bribe.
I assume that thereis alarge number of potential CIs(indexedbyj 2 J = f1;2;:::Ng),
each of whom lives forever and discounts the future at the same rate ± 2 (0;1). I parti-
tion the set of potential CIs into “active” and “inactive” CIs, JA and JI. Inactive CIs
do not make a report and make zero pro…ts. Active CIs make reports that are subject
to a no-collusion constraint similar to that in the previous section. The timing of the
“stage game” is the same as with the monopolist, with all certi…ers choosing strategies
28simultaneously.
The no-collusion constraint will be similar to that in the previous section, adjusted
to accommodate the problem with many certi…ers. As before, I consider an equilibrium
in which each CI’s strategy must be collusion-proof: the long-run payo¤s that each CI
receives must be high enough to outweigh the one-shot gains from accepting a bribe and




have for all j 2 JA
±¼j(P
¤) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)[W(hj;P
¤)¡ W(lj;P
¤)] (NC0)
As with monopoly, my assumption on buyer beliefs allows all strategies within this
set that satisfy (NC0). We can imagine each CI choosing a strategy at t = 0 which will
be repeated forever, from among those that are credible.
The assumption on beliefs is in some ways more problematic here than with a
monopoly CI. We need to worry about how each CI expects the others to respond to a
given change in policy. Again I appeal to the idea that we are looking here at the most
optimistic conditions for a credible CI to operate.
Since we assume that any strategy that could be part of a truthful equilibrium is









j such that (NC
0) holds.
This condition says that no CI has available a strategy that is credible (satis…es (NC0))
and o¤ers him higher pro…ts.
In the next two subsections I will describe the implications of these assumptions for
equilibria withcerti…cates and with guidebooks. First, note that there cannot be both an
active guidebook-seller and anactive certi…cate-seller. Since the certi…cate-seller publicly
reveals the seller’s quality, there is no reason for buyers to pay for the guidebook. In
a more realistic model there might be room for both to operate simultaneously, for
example if di¤erent intermediaries certify di¤erent quality dimensions, or if the certi…er
29could provide only an imperfect signal of quality.
5.1. certi…cate equilibria
With certi…cates, CIs compete by o¤ering lower fees to the seller. Thus the equilibrium
will be characterized by the lowest fee that is still large enough to make honest reporting
incentive-compatible.
First I will demonstrate that in equilibrium there can be only one active CI. Note
that if two CIs are o¤ering di¤erent certi…cate fees, and both are credible, then the CI
will choose the cheaper one. So if there is to be more than one active CI, each must be
charging the same fee and the seller must choose each with positive probability. Let °j
represent the probability that the seller chooses CI j. The no-collusion constraint will be
±
1¡ ±
°j®jµ(vH ¡ 1) ¸ (vH ¡ 1) (NC0
F)
The left-hand side is the value of future business to the CI, and the right-hand side is
the largest bribe that a low-quality seller would be willing to pay for a false certi…cation.
Suppose °j < 1 and CI j o¤ers a slightly lower fee, ®j ¡ ". The seller would strictly
prefer the lower fee, and so would be willing to choose CI j with probability 1 if the CI
is credible. Since °j < 1, there is an " small enough that (NC0
F) will be satis…ed. In
other words, the minimum fee that satis…es (NC0
F) is decreasing in the CI’s market share.
This means that if the seller is choosing each CI with positive probability, one CI could
lower his fee slightly and capture the entire market, so that his policy is still credible. In
essence, there will be only one CI because the no-collusion constraint is arti…cially strong
when there are two.
The result that only one CI is active does not mean that he has monopoly power; it
follows from the fact that, with asingle active CI, that CI can a¤ordto o¤er a lower price
while still satisfying the no-collusion constraint. The threat of “entry” by another CI
means that the active CI charges the lowest fee that satis…es the no-collusion constraint.
Note that if there were several sellers in each period, the result does not mean that all
30sellers would be certi…ed by the same CI. Rather, it says that each seller will be certi…ed
by one speci…c CI with probability one.
In an equilibrium with certi…cates it must be that no CI could change his fee and
receive higher pro…ts. This means that thefee charged will be the lowestthat is consistent
with (NC0
F). Since (NC0
F) binds for an active CI, the certi…cate fee will be given by
® = 1¡±
±µ . If this is greater than one, certi…cates will never be credible. These results are
summarized in Proposition 5.1 below.
Proposition 5.1. With competing intermediaries, a certi…cate equilibrium will exist if
and only if µ ¸ 1¡±
± : There will be only a single active CI, and the certi…cate fee will be
given by ® = 1¡±
±µ .
Notice that as ± approaches one, the CI’s fee approaches zero, as the value of future
business becomes large relative to the current rewards of cheating. The fee is also de-
creasing in µ, since a greater proportion of certi…ed sellers increases the average pro…ts of
the CI without changing the bribe that a low-quality seller would be willing to pay. The
fee does not depend on vH, since an increase in vH increases both the value to cheating
and to not cheating by the same proportion.
5.2. Guidebook equilibria
With guidebooks, the value of certi…cation is less than with certi…cates (ignoring the
certi…cationfee), sincenotall buyers observe theCI’sreport. As discussedintheprevious
section, the largest bribe that a seller would be willing to pay CI j is given by mj^ V(m),
while the per-period payo¤ of an honest CI is mjx(m), where x is the price that the CI
charges for information and m =
N P
i=1
mi is the total number of guidebooks sold. For a
guidebook-seller, (NC0) implies
±mjx(m) ¸ (1¡ ±)mj ^ V (m)
or
±x(m) ¸ (1¡ ±)^ V(m) (NC0
G)
31Note that (NC0
G) depends only on the total number of guidebooks sold, not on the
number of guidebooks sold by an individual CI. This means that, unlike with certi…cates,
with guidebooks the number of active certi…ers and their relative market shares are
indeterminate.
Recall that a monopolist guidebook seller chooses to limit m in order to maintain
the value of the information he sells. If we have a large number of intermediaries, no
individual CI will have a large enough incentive to lower m in order to increase the price
of guidebooks, so m will increase to the point where a guidebook-seller is barely credible.
This means that we can be sure that (NC0
G) will bind.
To determine whether there is an equilibrium in which guidebooks are feasible, it
is su¢cient to check whether (NC0
G) is satis…ed for complete pooling (m = mP). The
left-hand side of (NC0
G) is decreasing in m, and the right-hand side is increasing in m
for m > mP. Therefore if the condition fails for complete pooling, then it will never
be satis…ed. Substituting for x(m) and ^ V(m), this means that guidebooks will only be
feasible if
±[µ(vH ¡ ¹ V )+ (1 ¡ µ)(¹ V ¡ 1)] ¸ (1¡ ±)¹ V
which can be rewritten as
vH ¸
(1¡ µ)[±µ + (1¡ ±)]
µ[±(1¡ µ) ¡ (1¡ ±)]
: (5.1)
The condition for credibility is the same as for the monopolist. This is because
under competition, the active CI is making at most what the monopolist makes, so the
credibility constraint must be at least as strong. The boundary will be where, even under
the monopoly strategy, the CI is barely credible.
Since we know that with guidebooks (NC0
G) must bind, we can solve for m and the
price charged by high-quality sellers. We …nd that
^ V(m) = 1+
[±µ(vH ¡ 1)¡ (1 ¡ ±)]
[±µ +(1 ¡ ±)]
: (5.2)
32Note that when ± = 1, we will have complete separation, with ^ V(m) = vH. When the
credibility constraint (5.1) binds, we will have ^ V(m) = ¹ V .
Because not all information is revealed through guidebooks, sellers would still be
willing to pay to signal their quality to the uninformed. In order for guidebooks to be
part of equilibrium, it must be the case that a credible certi…cate-seller cannot enter.
A high-quality seller receives a price of ^ V (m) with guidebooks, so the value of public
certi…cation to a high-quality seller would be vH¡ ^ V (m). The no-collusion constraint for
a certi…cate-seller would be
±µ[vH ¡ ^ V(m)] ¸ (1¡ ±)(vH ¡ 1):





Proposition 5.2. With competing intermediaries, if vH ¸
(1¡µ)[µ±+(1¡±)]
µ[±(1¡µ)¡(1¡±)] and vH ¸ 1 +
±
1¡±µ then there is an equilibrium with guidebooks. The number of guidebooks sold will
satisfy ^ V(m) =
±µvH
±µ+(1¡±).
5.3. Equilibria with competition
Figure 4 illustrates which outcome we will expect as a function of parameter values. The
conditions for feasibility are the same for both monopoly and competition. However,
there is a range in which either certi…cates or guidebooks could be the equilibrium: given
certi…cates, there is no way for a guidebook-seller to enter, and vice-versa.
Intuitively, the impact of competition is what we would expect given the decision
between certi…cates and guidebooks: more of the surplus is going to the sellers. With
certi…cates, the fees are lower, since CIs compete to attract high-quality sellers. With
guidebooks, more buyers are informed, since the CI cannot restrict supply too much
without encouraging the other CI to ful…l unmet demand. However, because of the














Figure 5.1: Equilibrium with Competing Intermediaries
34competition when we would have gotten guidebooks with monopoly, and that the high-
quality sellers prefer the guidebooks.
6. Equilibrium seller investment
Up to now I have considered a model in which the typical ine¢ciencies arising from
asymmetric information do not take place. Since sellers do not value their goods, ex-
change always takes place. And since sellers do not choose the quality of their good, the
incentives to produce quality are not important. This means that certi…cation does not
a¤ect the amount of social surplus, but only its distribution. To answer questions of how
and when markets form, we would like to consider a case in which high-quality sellers
will not enter the market in the absence of some way to communicate their quality. In
this section I will assume that the seller chooses whether to invest in quality. In this case
certi…cation plays a central role in e¢ciency. The seller will only be willing to make an
investment in the quality of her good if buyers are informed about her investment. In
the absence of an intermediary, all sellers receive the same price, so that even those who
can inexpensively produce high quality will not have an incentive to do so. The amount
of information revealed by the CI and the fee that the seller must pay for certi…cation
will a¤ect investment incentives, and thus a¤ect social surplus.
I assume that the seller in period t can produce a high-quality good by incurring
a …xed cost ct, while no investment is necessary to produce a good of low quality. As
before, once the quality of the good is determined the seller can produce an unlimited
amount at zero marginal cost. The investment cost ct is drawn at the beginning of the
period from a distribution function F(c). F(c) is common knowledge, but the realized
value of ct is private information of the seller.
The timing of the game is as in the previous section. The only di¤erence is that in
the …rst period, instead of nature choosing the seller’s quality level, nature chooses ct
from F(c), and the seller decides whether to invest in quality.
Since each period is identical, I will drop the time subscript. Equilibrium will consist
35of a strategy for the sellers, fQ(c);p(Q)g, beliefs and demand functions for the buyers,
fb(p);d(r;p)g, a partition of the CIs into active and inactive, and strategies for the active
CIs, P¤ = ft;m;®g; such that for the sellers




d(p;r) = f I[p · b(p)] for uninformed
I[p · vQ] for informed








j such that (NC
0) holds.
±¼j(P ¤) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)[W(hj;P ¤)¡ W(lj;P¤)] (NC0)
where µ is the probability that the seller is of high quality, given the policy Q(c).
The di¤erence here is that the strategies of the CIs a¤ect the seller’s incentives to
invest. Note, however, that CIs do not take this into account when choosing a policy,
so that their payo¤s will depend on their strategies in the same way as in the previous
section.
First I present a straightforward result. If it is optimal for a seller with costs c0 to
invest in quality, then it will also be optimal for any seller with costs c < c0. Thus we can
describe the best response of the seller in terms of some c¤ such that whenever the seller
observes c · c¤ she will choose to invest. The probability that the seller chooses high
quality (µ from the previous section) will therefore be given by F(c¤). Since the rest of
the game is unchanged, the results of the previous section for player strategies will still
hold, with F(c¤) replacing µ.
The e¢cient outcome, which would result from full information, would be for sellers
to invest whenever the cost of doing so is less than the marginal value of high quality
36to buyers. This means that the optimal investment, c¤¤, is given by c¤¤ = (vH ¡ 1).
The …rst-best will be achieved if there is no asymmetric information problem, that is
if certi…cation is free and accurate. However, as we saw in the previous section, in
equilibrium certi…cation will not be free - the certi…er must be making some pro…ts in
order to maintain incentives for honest reporting. This implies that the equilibrium level
of seller investment will always be less than the optimum; that is, c¤ · (vH ¡ 1).
The incentive for a seller to invest will depend on how information is revealed; that
is, it will depend on CI strategies. CI strategies, in turn, will depend on the probability
of the seller investing in quality, F(c¤). In fact, I will show that this relationship will
be complimentary: when sellers invest in quality more frequently, credible certi…cation
becomes easier, which increases the value to sellers of investing in quality. This com-
plementarity suggests the possibility of coordination failures, in which few sellers invest
because certi…cationis expensive, and certi…cationis expensive because fewsellers invest.
Recall that W(r;µ) is de…ned as the value to a seller of receiving report r, net of any
certi…cate fee. The probability of a seller investing, µ, a¤ects W because it determines
either the certi…cate fee or the number of guidebooks sold. The optimal policy of the
seller will be to invest in quality if the di¤erence in payo¤s of certi…ed and uncerti…ed
sellers, W(h;µ)¡W(l;µ), is greater than or equal to the cost of investing in quality. This
means that in equilibrium we will have c¤ = W(h;µ)¡ W(l;µ).
Combining this with the results of the previous section, we can characterize equilib-
rium seller investment in quality. For certi…cates, investment will be described by
W(h;µ)¡ W(l;µ) = (1¡ ®)(vH ¡ 1) = c¤ (6.1)





For guidebooks, the value of investment is given by
W(h;µ) ¡ W(l;µ) = ^ V(m) ¡ 1 = c¤ (6.3)
37and m is de…ned as in the previous section by
^ V(m)¡ 1 =
[±µ(vH ¡ 1) ¡ (1¡ ±)]
[±µ + (1¡ ±)]
: (6.4)
To describe the equilibrium more completely, we need to specify the form of the
distribution function F(c). First, I will show that there is a complementarity between
the value of certi…cation and investment in quality. Then I will describe the equilibrium
more precisely for the case where F(c) is the uniform distribution.
Proposition 6.1. The value of certi…cation, W(h;µ) ¡ W(l;µ), is increasing in µ for
certi…cates. For guidebooks, W(h;µ) ¡ W(l;µ) is increasing in µ over those values of µ
for which guidebooks are credible.
To see this, …rst consider certi…cates. Combining (6.1) and (6.2), we see that the




)(vH ¡ 1): (6.5)
This is increasing in the proportion of certi…ed sellers µ. When µ increases, the no-
collusion constraint is relaxed, so that the CI must receive a lower portion of the surplus
to remain credible. This in turn increases the bene…ts to being certi…ed, so that a larger
set of seller types will …nd it optimal to invest in quality.
With guidebooks, (6.3) and (6.4) imply that the value of certi…cation is given by
[±µ(vH ¡ 1)¡ (1 ¡ ±)]
[±µ +(1 ¡ ±)]
; (6.6)
which is again increasing in µ. When more sellers are certi…ed, certi…ed sellers receive
a higher price, increasing the incentive for the seller to invest in quality. In fact there
may be “more pooling” for higher values of µ (z may be increasing in µ), but this is
outweighed by the fact that on average there is higher quality. The exception would be if
µ becomes large enough to violate the (NC) constraint. When µ increases past this point
guidebooks will not be credible, so that the value to being certi…ed by a guidebook-seller
is zero.
38The importanceof Proposition6.1 is that it implies we may have coordinationfailures.
It may be that a Pareto-superior equilibrium, with relatively e¢cient certi…cation and
frequent seller investment, is not achieved because for low levels of seller investment an
e¢cient certi…cation strategy does not satisfy the no-collusion constraint.
I next work out the equilibrium conditions when the sellers’ cost c is distributed
uniformly on the interval [0;¹ c]. For certi…cates, combining (6.1) and (6.2) gives us
c
¤ = (1¡
¹ c(1 ¡ ±)
±c¤ )(vH ¡ 1)
or
(c¤)2¡ (vH ¡ 1)c¤ +
1¡ ±
±
(vH ¡ 1)¹ c = 0:
This equation has real roots, and therefore a certi…cate equilibrium exists, if and only if




For guidebooks, combining (6.3) and (6.4) gives us
c
¤ =
±(vH ¡ 1)c¤ ¡ (1¡ ±)¹ c
±c¤ + (1¡ ±)¹ c
or
±(c¤)2 + [¹ c(1¡ ±)¡ ±(vH ¡ 1)]c¤+ ¹ c(1¡ ±) = 0
This equation has real roots, and therefore a guidebook equilibrium exists, if and only if








Figure 5 illustrates the certi…cate case. First, there in an equilibrium in which sellers
never invest and, because of this, certi…ers cannot o¤er a credible strategy. With no
high-quality sellers, certi…ers make no pro…ts, so that there would be no potential cost
to losing buyers’ trust. Even with positive seller investment, however, there are multiple
equilibria. At (A), low seller investment means that to prevent collusion, the certi…er
must charge a high fee. At this point, a hypothetical increase in the seller’s cuto¤ value









Figure 6.1: Multiple equilibria when investment in quality is endogenous.
than c¤, meaning that the cuto¤ value would increase by even more. At (B), there is a
new equilibrium with a higher level of seller investment and lower certi…cate fees.
The implicationis that markets may fail to formas the result ofa coordinationfailure.
Even though the “technology” exists to transfer informationabout quality to buyers, and
there are private incentives to do so, the scarcity of high-quality sellers in the market
means that credible certi…cation cannot take place.
7. Conclusion
Asymmetric information plays a signi…cant role in the way exchange is organized. For an
economy to enjoy the gains from trade that characterize anonymous markets, there must
be some way for agents to trust their trading partners. Understanding the conditions
under which such trust can be established is one of the most important steps toward
understanding the process of economic development.
This paper focuses on how private-sector intermediaries can form part of the insti-
40tutional structure that allows markets to function. Private institutions are only one of
many types of institution that help markets to work. E¤ective courts are important to
enforce contracts, and social norms may limit opportunistic behavior. Focusing on a
pro…t-maximizing intermediary is convenient in that it allows us to endogenize the insti-
tutional form of the intermediary in a relatively straightforward way. The results here
may have implications even for public intermediaries faced with similar credibility issues.
There are many possible extensions to the model presented here. One natural step
would be to consider the role of competition between sellers. In the case where sellers
invest in quality, competition will mean that sellers keep less of the surplus generated by
such an investment. On the other hand, competition may drive uncerti…ed goods out of
the market, thereby increasing the incentives of sellers to invest.
Another extension is to consider the possibility of shirking on the part of the CI.
It is natural to suppose that buyers and sellers cannot observe whether the CI in fact
inspected a product, and if inspection is costly we will have a moral hazard problem.
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448. Appendix
Lemma 4.1 Proof.





















(1¡ m)3 < 0
So the …rst order condition will be su¢cient if the solution is interior; that is, if
d¼CI
dm > 0 at m = mP. Since mP =
¹ V¡1





¹ V )2 > 0
vH ¡ ¹ V
2 > 0
vH > [µvH + (1¡ µ)]2 = µ2v2
H + 2µ(1¡ µ)vH + (1 ¡µ)2
0 > µ
2v2
H + [2µ(1 ¡ µ) ¡ 1]vH + (1¡ µ)2
vH 2 (
1¡ 2µ(1¡ µ)¡ (1 ¡2µ)
2µ
2 ;












dm will always be negative and the CI will choose m = mP,
implying z = 1. If vH <
(1¡µ)2

















45Proposition 4.2 Proof. From Lemma 4.1, we know that when the CI sells guidebooks,
he will prefer partial pooling to complete pooling if and only if vH < (
1¡µ
µ )2. Thus
we simply have to compare guidebook pro…ts in each of these cases to pro…ts when
sellers pay.
When there is partial pooling, pro…ts when sellers pay will be higher than pro…ts
when buyers pay if











When there is complete pooling, pro…ts when sellers pay will be higher than pro…ts
when buyers pay if
¯µ(vH ¡ 1) >
µ
2(1¡ µ)(vH ¡ 1)2
µ(vH ¡ 1) + 1
(8.4)
If (1¡ µ) ¸ ¯, then (8.4) reduces to




If (1¡ µ) < ¯; then (8.4) reduces to
vH >
(1¡ µ)(2µ + ¯)
µ[(1¡ µ)¡ ¯]
which is always true for (1¡ µ) < ¯.
Derviation of (NCG) Per-period pro…ts for an honest guidebook-seller are given by









The right-hand side is increasing in ^ V (m), so if the inequality holds for ¹ V it will




+ 1][µ(vH ¡ 1) +1]
46Which can be rewritten as
vH ¡ 1 ¸
1 ¡±
µ[±(1 ¡ µ) ¡ (1¡ ±)]
or
vH ¸
(1 ¡ µ)[±µ + (1¡ ±)]
µ[±(1¡ µ)¡ (1 ¡ ±)]
:
47